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1. Introduction 
In both Ireland and Italy, the participation in off-farm employment is a necessity for many 
farm households given the small-scale nature of their farming operations. For example, the 
smallest one-quarter of farms in Ireland account for just about 3% of all gross agricultural 
output and for about 10% of all gross agricultural output in the case of Italy (Moreddu, 2011). 
Many farm households cannot therefore rely upon farming as their only income source. In 
addition, the entry into off-farm employment can be driven by other push and pull factors. In 
this paper, we model the decision to enter off-farm employment and the number of off-farm 
labour hours for farm holders in both countries. We place particular emphasis on the possible 
role of the decoupling of direct payments in 2005, given that this radical reform altered the 
incentives for farm holders towards off-farm employment in both countries. 
Prior to the introduction of decoupling, farmers in Ireland and Italy benefited from price 
supports, which motivated them to increase production levels and therefore commit longer 
working hours to farm labour than would otherwise have been the case. In addition to the 
well recognised trade distortion impacts, these policies constrained the amount of time 
available for off-farm work participation. After the 2005 reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, farmers received support independently of their production decisions as long as they 
complied with the “Statutory Management Requirements” and maintained their land in 
“Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition”. The new policy environment thereby 
changed the incentives for farmers towards off-farm employment. 
According to neo-classical economic theory, an increase in off-farm employment is not an 
inevitable outcome of this reform given that the introduction of the decoupled single farm 
payment provided a new non-labour source of income i.e. a wealth effect. In this framework, 
the substitution effect must compete against the wealth effect in order to determine whether 
or not off-farm labour supply responded significantly to the new policy regime. Previous 
empirical work by Hennessy & Rehman (2008) found evidence to support this theoretical 
model in the case of Irish farmers prior to the introduction of the reforms. In the US, Ahearn 
et al. (2006 analysed ex-post the effect of the FAIR Act (Federal Agriculture Improvement 
and Reform Act of 1996, known informally as the Freedom to Farm Act or the 1996 US Farm 
Bill. This introduced production flexibility contract (PFC) payments to be somewhat 
decoupled payments from production (Lin et. al., 2000). Ahearn et al. (2006 found that the 
introduction of decoupled payments increased off-farm labour supply among those already 
engaged in off-farm work but that neither coupled nor decoupled payments were found to be 
significant drivers in the decision to participate in off-farm employment. 
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In the Italian literature, a recent paper by Corsi & Salvioni (2012) examined the impact of the 
2005 CAP reform on off-farm labour participation rates among 437 cereal, oilseed and 
protein crop farmers. This particular study found that working capital has a negative and 
significant effect on the probability of off-farm work participation of the farm operator. 
Location factors are found to be important in that farm holders located in the mountains 
have an 8.4% higher probability of having an off-farm job. The single farm payment is found 
however not to be a significant driver of participation among this subset of farms. It will be 
interesting to identify in this paper as to whether or not this result differs for a wider sample 
of Italian farms from different farm systems. Unlike our paper, the paper by Corsi and 
Salvioni did not examine the supply of off-farm labour hours.  
While large reforms can alter the incentives towards off-farm employment, the literature in 
this area has over a longer period examined the role of individual, family and other 
characteristics in the relevant off-farm labour supply decisions. Huffman (1977 and 1980) 
presented evidence that investment in education and agricultural extension services 
increases farmers’ off-farm labour supply by increasing the reallocative ability of farmers. 
Other studies have supported the significant influence of local labour market conditions, 
focusing on the distance from a metropolitan area and the local rate of unemployment among 
other factors. Sumner (1982) showed that urbanisation positively influences the participation 
rate because of the increase in off-farm job opportunities. Tokle & Huffman (1991) proved the 
significant effect of local economic conditions such as the anticipation of labour demand 
growth, unemployment rates and share of employment in services.   
The importance of farm characteristics and farm family structure in the decision to 
participate in off-farm work has also been the subject of a number of studies. Kilkenny (1993) 
and Kimihi (1994) present evidence that participation in off-farm labour markets differs 
across farm type and family structure. Several papers showed that farm system and size, that 
is type of farm enterprise, affects the labour decision (e.g. Lass et al. 1989). Some studies 
have established the significance of the number of dependents on the farm income. Mishra & 
Goodwin (1997) found a negative effect between the number of children and the number of 
hours worked off farm by farmers’ spouses. The effect of children on farmers’ time allocation 
is less clear. Lass et al. (1991) explain that on the one hand childcare may require a husband’s 
time, but on the other hand the presence of more children may generate greater pressure to 
achieve additional income due to the consumption needs of a larger family. 
The risk preferences of the farm operator also come within the wider neo-classical 
framework. Off-farm employment can potentially provide a more stable form of income than 
farm income. The risk-averse nature of farmers can therefore manifest itself in greater off-
farm employment participation as found by Barlett (1991) and Mishra & Goodwin (1997). 
Hennessy (1998) found that the introduction of decoupled payments can, however, induce 
farmers to take riskier production decisions leading to an expansion in farm output and a 
decline in off-farm employment in response to the decline in farm income risk exposure.  
This paper uses an agricultural household modelling framework to consider the substitution 
and wealth effects of decoupled payments and the implications for farmers’ off-farm labour 
participation and supply decisions. The paper provides an ex-post assessment. This contrasts 
with the ex-ante analysis of Irish farms by Hennessy & Rehman, which relied upon 
projections at the macro level. The arrival of the economic recession in 2008 changed the 
macroeconomic picture in both Ireland and Italy substantially and it would be interesting to 
identify whether or not the introduction of decoupled payments managed to make a 
significant impact against such a background. 
The paper is similar in some respects to the work on Italian crop farmers by Corsi & Salvioni. 
However, in comparison, a wider sample of farms is included in this study and over a longer 
time period, considering also many small farmers where, at least in theory, off-farm income 
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source should be more relevant.1 In addition, we model the determination of labour hours 
and we provide a unique ex-post cross-country analysis regarding the impact of decoupling 
on off-farm employment. The paper draws from the literature on female labour supply and 
uses a sample selection corrected ordinary least squares model to examine both off farm work 
participation decisions and decisions regarding the amount of time spent working off-farm. 
In the next section, we describe the conceptual framework behind the model used. This is 
followed in section 3 by a brief summary on the policy background. The methodology and 
data sections (4 and 5) offer a separate description of the data sources in each country. 
Section 6 discusses the regression results, followed finally by the conclusion. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
A neoclassical household model based on utility maximisation is used to model farm 
households’ labour allocation decisions. This model is the most common approach in the 
literature and stems from the seminal paper by Becker (1965). The model rests on the neo-
classical assumption that households behave to maximise their utility function defined over 
consumption commodities. Lee (1965) was among the first to extend this labour-leisure 
model for the special case of farm operator households. 
In this paper, we deal specifically with the labour allocation decisions of the farm operator 
and so a reduced form of the agricultural household model is used that only represents the 
decisions of the farm operator. This leads to a simpler model as it excludes among other 
things the possible interdependence between the farm operator and the spouse in the 
decision-making process. The Utility function, U is assumed to be a function of consumption 
C and leisure time L as expressed by equation 1.  
 Maximise U= f (C, L)  (1) 
subject to  
 T= L + O + F  O≥0 (2) 
 C Pc= w O + (Pf Yf   - If X f) + V  (3) 
 W= W (H,Z)  (4) 
Equation 2 shows that the utility function is maximised subject to time constraints as the 
farmer’s total time endowment T is finite and is allocated between leisure (L), off-farm work 
(O) and farm work (F). In the case of agriculture, it can be assumed that time allocated to 
leisure and farm work is positive but for many farmers the time allocated to non-farm work is 
zero, hence the inequality in equation 2.  
Equation 3 shows that the utility function is maximised subject to budget constraints. The 
total household Consumption, C, is constrained by equating total consumption with total 
income i.e. consumption cannot exceed income and savings do not exist. Income can be 
derived from the off-farm work income, wO, the farm profit and the exogenous household 
wealth V, that is wealth that is not derived from farm or off-farm labour. The off-farm income 
is due to the wage rate w multiplied by the off-farm hours O while the farm profit amounts to 
the price of farm goods produced Pf by the volume of production Yf  less the cost of 
production, i.e. the cost of farm inputs If  by the volume of output Yf.  
The farm operator faces an off-farm wage rate W that is a function of H the farmer’s human 
capital and Z the local labour market conditions.2  The trade off between time spent farming 
                                                        
1 For example, in the Corsi & Salvioni sample, the average farm size in UAA is equal to 53.37 ha., 
whereas the average size in our sample is 24.2 ha and 36.7 ha for the Italian and Irish samples, 
respectively. 
2 The household model can also include a technology constraint which constrains farm output to be a 
function of farm labour, human capital and farm-specific factors. This is excluded in this reduced form 
of the agricultural household model presented here, as the interest of this research lies in the empirical 
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and time spent off the farm is conceptualised diagrammatically by Sumner (1982) and is 
recreated in Donnellan & Hennessy (2012). 
The decision to participate in off-farm employment is binary. Rational individuals are 
expected to participate when the off-farm wage offered exceeds their reservation wage. This 
can be expressed as follows,  
 E[I¦X] = P(Oi = 1) = P(wr<wi) = ß’X  (5) 
where P(Oi = 1) is the probability of Oi = 1, that is participating in off-farm employment, 
which occurs if wr<wi, that is the reservation wage rate is less than the wage offered off-farm. 
The probability of participating in off-farm work is estimated using a vector of exogenous 
variables X that are hypothesised to influence the latent reservation wage and off-farm wage 
rates and therefore the participation decision. Variables that increase the off-farm wage rate 
relative to the reservation wage increase the probability of off-farm work and the opposite is 
true for variables that decrease the off-farm wage rate (Huffman,. 1988). 
The supply function for off-farm work is determined by the optimal level of leisure hours and 
off-farm work hours, as described in equation 6.  
 O =T- L - F = f(wi, Pf , If,  V, H, Z) (6) 
The number of hours supplied to off-farm work O is a function of the off-farm wage wi, farm 
profit, i.e. output less costs  P f - If , exogenous household income V, the farm operator’s 
human capital H and local employment market conditions Z. 
3. Policy Background 
Ireland and Italy are among 10 EU member states that decoupled EU direct payments from 
agricultural production in 2005 under the introduction of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). 
A further seven member states followed this path in subsequent years while 10 new member 
states embarked upon the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS). Ireland in common with 
Luxembourg, Malta and the UK (excluding Scotland) decoupled all direct payments from 
production while Italy retained some coupling payments for certain crop production, like rice 
and tobacco. These reforms formed part of the Luxembourg Agreement on the reform of the 
CAP announced in September 2003.  
On the introduction of the SPS, each member state had the option of choosing between three 
different implementation models: the historical model, the regional model, and the hybrid 
model. Ireland and Italy are among the majority of countries which chose to implement the 
historical model of payments. This meant that the allocation of entitlements became based on 
a historical reference period from 2000-02.  
The adoption of the historical model limited the extent to which the reforms could impact 
directly on the distribution of farm income between farm households. In contrast to Ireland 
and Italy, the new member states (excluding Malta and Slovenia) implemented the regional 
model which set a uniform payment per hectare. A small number of countries (Denmark, 
Luxemburg, Sweden, Northern Ireland Finland, Germany, and England) embarked upon a 
hybrid version of the other two models. 
Access to the SPS came with certain conditions for farmers. In order to access the scheme, 
farmers must have received direct payments during the reference period from 2000-02 and 
the reference amount is based upon the three year average of the total direct payments 
received in this reference period. Farmers are required to maintain the land ‘in good 
agricultural and environmental condition’ and furthermore that land under permanent 
pasture at the date of the area aid application is maintained under permanent pasture. 
O’Neill & Hanrahan (2012) explained that these requirements may have motivated some 
                                                                                                                                                                             
evaluation of the effect of government subsidies on the allocation of farmers’ time and the interplay 
between farm and off-farm work.  
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farmers to keep land in agricultural use and that without such requirements the land would 
be left idle or converted to non-agricultural use. These conditions may in turn have some 
implications for the decision to enter off-farm employment. 
As discussed in the previous sections, the effect of decoupling of farm payments on off-farm 
labour participation tends to be ambiguous (Serra et al., 2005). Indeed, on the one hand, we 
can expect a reduction of the relative return to (farm) labour, and thus economic theory 
would suggest that the probability of farmers participating in off-farm activities should 
increase. However, on the other hand, as decoupled payments are also a source of wealth for 
the farm household, the budget constraint would be relaxed and could reduce the need or 
desire for off-farm income (Dewbre & Mishra, 2007; Hennessy and Rehman, 2008). Thus, 
overall, which of the two effects will prevail is an empirical question that we address in the 
next sections. 
4. Methodology 
In this section, we describe the econometric methodology used to model the off-farm labour 
supply of farm operators in Ireland and Italy. Our primary objective is to identify the extent 
to which different factors contribute towards the hours of off-farm labour supply for farm 
operators in both countries. We wish to estimate the hours equation in the following: 
 ܱܪܴ ௜ܵ௧
כ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ’ଵ ଵܺ௜௧
כ ൅ ߝଵ௜௧ (7) 
where ܱܪܴ ௜ܵ௧
כ
 represents the hours of off-farm labour and ߝଵ௜௧ is the regression error term. 
The term ଵܺ௜௧
כ  represents the independent variables and ߚ’ଵ represents the coefficient 
parameter for these variables. Our chosen model is a fixed effects estimator. We therefore 
decompose the error term ߝଵ௜௧ into an unknown constant ݒଵ௜௧ which differs only across 
individuals and the random error term ݑଵ௜௧ which is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed over time and individuals  
 ߝଵ௜௧ ൌ ݒଵ௜௧ ൅ ݑଵ௜௧. (8) 
As this is a fixed effects model, we allow for correlation between the constant ݒଵ௜௧ and the 
explanatory variables ଵܺ௜௧
כ  but we do not capture the effect of stable covariates. 
Studies of off-farm employment typically involve situations whereby a large proportion of the 
population have zero reported off-farm labour hours and wages due to non-participation in 
off-farm employment. Our conceptual framework claims that these instances of non-
participation are due to reservation wages being above offered wages i.e. where ݓ௜௧
௥כ>ݓ௜௧
௜כ. The 
reservation wage ݓ௜௧
௥כ is a latent variable where the latent model can be described as: 
 ݓ௜௧
௥כ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ’ ௜ܺ௧
כ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (9) 
where the observed binary participation in off-farm employment ௜ܱ௧ can be summarised as: 
 ௜ܱ௧ ൜
1 ݂݅ ሺݓ௜௧
௥כ ൐ 0ሻ
0 ݂݅ ሺݓ௜௧
௥כ ൏ 0ሻ
          (10) 
Equation 8 includes only those observations where the hours of off-farm labour supply 
ܱܪܴ ௜ܵ௧ are available i.e. where the farm operators are employed off-farm. This may suggest 
the problem of sample selection bias. We can attempt to overcome this problem by modelling 
the participation decision.  
We use a random effects Probit model for the off-farm participation decision ௜ܱ௧
כ  whereby: 
 ௜ܱ௧
כ ൌ exp ሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚ’ଶܺଶ௜
כ ሻ ൅ ߝଶ௜௧ (11) 
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where ௜ܱ௧
כ
 measures the probability of participation and ߝଶ௜௧ is the regression error term for 
this equation. The term ܺଶ௜
כ  represents the independent variables and ߚ’ଶ represents the 
coefficient parameter for these variables. The error term ߝଶ௜௧ is decomposed into a time 
invariant individual effect ݒଶ௜௧ and the random error term ݑଶ௜௧  which is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed over time and individuals.  
 ߝଶ௜௧ ൌ ݒଶ௜௧ ൅ ݑଶ௜௧ (12) 
Given that this is a random effects model, we therefore assume that there is no correlation 
between the individual effect ݒଶ௜௧ and the explicit explanatory variables ܺଶ௜
כ . 
We can test whether or not sample selection bias is a problem in the first instance by using 
the error terms from both the participation and labour supply models. Both error terms may 
be correlated as they both contain information about the reservation wage. If the correlation 
coefficient suggests that the error terms, ߝଵ௜௧ and ߝଶ௜௧ are uncorrelated, then the hours 
equation can be estimated consistently by ordinary least squares. If, however, this correlation 
is significant, then the inference is that some unobserved variable influences both decisions. 
The existence of the sample selection bias is therefore established and the estimates of the 
labour supply have to be corrected.  
Heckman (1979) provided a two-step method that can potentially correct for sample selection 
bias. This requires the estimation of the so-called inverse mills ratio. The Inverse Mills Ratio, 
( iλ
)
) can be estimated from the parameters of the participation model (Equation 11). This 
involves dividing the probability density function by the cumulative density function:   
        
)'(
)'(  
2
2
i β
βφλ
i
i
x
x
Φ=
)
 (13) 
This ratio iλ
)
 is used as an additional regressor in the second stage labour supply model. If a 
simple t-test suggests that the iλ
)
 coefficient is not significantly different from zero, then 
sample selection bias is not a problem and the OLS model can be regarded as consistent.  If 
the simple t-test suggests that the iλ
)
 coefficient is significantly different from zero, we can 
then imply that sample selection bias is present i.e. the farm operators engaging in off-farm 
employment have certain unobserved characteristics which differ on average in value from 
those farm operators not engaging in off-farm employment. In the neo-classical model, these 
differences are absorbed through the reservation wage variable Wr. 
5. Data 
In this section, we describe the data sources used for the analysis in both countries. The Irish 
analysis utilises the Teagasc National Farm Survey, which is essentially the Irish FADN 
database but containing richer data on off-farm labour supply. O’Brien & Hennessy (2006) 
described the objectives of the National Farm Survey (NFS) as being to: 
1. Determine the financial situation on Irish farms by measuring the level of gross output, 
costs, income, investment and indebtedness across the spectrum of farming systems and 
sizes,  
2. Provide data on Irish farm incomes to the EU Commission in Brussels (FADN),  
3. Measure the current levels of, and variation in, farm performance for use as standards for 
farm management purposes and  
4. Provide a database for economic and rural development research and policy analysis.  
To achieve these objectives, a farm accounts book is recorded for each year on a random 
sample of farms, selected by the CSO, throughout the country. The National Farm Survey is 
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designed to collect and analyse information relating to farming activities as its primary 
objective. Information and data relating to other activities by the household are considered 
secondary and as such where this information is presented it should be interpreted with 
caution.  
The Teagasc NFS represents panel data of the form xit, where xit is a vector of observations 
for farmer i in year t. As pointed out by O’Brien & Hennessy (2006), the panel is unbalanced 
in the sense that there is some attrition from year to year as farmers leave the sample and are 
replaced by other farms. The attrition rate is relatively low however and a sizeable proportion 
of the farms are contained in the dataset for all of the years concerned. New farmers are 
introduced during the period to maintain a representative sample and the sample size is 
usually kept to between 1000 and 1100 farms.  
The Italian analysis utilises the data from the Farm Business Survey (REA) carried out by the 
Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The database yearly surveys a sample of agricultural 
holdings representative of the Italian agriculture, stratified by regions, farm types and 
economic size of holdings. Besides a detailed set of variables on farm structure, the database 
includes household’s composition variables as well as extra-farm source of income variables. 
The study covers an average of 3,573 farms per year, in a balanced panel that includes only 
farms surveyed for the entire period analysed.   
The purpose to utilise almost the same list of variables for both countries induces the 
necessity to define some of them from the available data. Thus, the dependent variable ‘off-
farm work participation’ of the holder is derived in the database from the existence of off-
farm wage, while the ‘amount of hours spent working off-farm’ is obtained indirectly using 
the information related on the off-farm wage and on the hours worked on farm by the farmer. 
Also some independent variables required a derivation from dataset information. The 
‘married’ status of farmer comes from the spouse information, which could be not recorded 
however if he/she doesn’t work in the farm nor earns any extra-farm income. In the same 
way, the ‘number of family members living in the farm’ and the ‘number of young in the 
family farm’, due to the nature of the available data that mainly include family members 
working on or off-farm, do not allow a precise estimation of family size and could 
underestimate the real dimension of these data. Finally, for binary variable ‘Specialist Dairy’ 
we report value 1 when farm belongs to business productivity activity of cow breeding and the 
number of cows is more than one, with a possible over-dimensioning of the unitary values. 
The data for both countries covers the period from 2002 to 2009 and therefore includes three 
years prior to the decoupling reform in 2005 and the four years immediately after the reform. 
We use approximately the same list of variables from both datasets and the mean values for 
these variables are presented below in table 1.  
Table 1. Mean value statistics for Italian and Irish data 
 ITALY IRELAND 
Dependent variables Off-farm 
employed  
Full sample Off farm 
employed 
Full sample 
Off-farm job (Head)  23.0  36.3 
Off-farm hours per annum 466.71 113.19 1572.35 570.65 
Independent variables     
Age 53.40 55.78 48.98 54.35 
Sex (= 1 male; 2 female) 1.29 1.34 1.03 1.05 
Specialist dairy 0.0927 0.1388 0.0540 0.1571 
UAA (ha) 15.11 24.18 27.47 36.72 
Spouse (= 1 if work off-farm ) 0.1146 0.0656 0.4190 0.3167 
Married (= 1 if married) 0.3709 0.4114 0.7449 0.6730 
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Number of young in the family farm 0.0801 0.0465 0.8318 0.6278 
Number of family members living in 
the farm 
1.8457 1.9466 3.6214 3.2889 
Number of family members working in 
the farm 
0.2409 0.3482 N/A N/A 
Hired (= 1 if presence of hired 
workers) 
0.2099 0.2617 0.1097 0.1827 
Number of bovine on UAA 0.7564 0.8798 1.1429 1.3093 
Decoupled payments  2,529 5,441 7,237 9,059 
Coupled Income 2,517 3,936 2,636 7,780 
Other subsidies (investment aids, 
organic payments …) 
442 630 2,676 2,764 
Average number of farms each year 825 3,573 330 1,184 
 
The mean values provided include both the dependent variables and the independent 
variables from our analysis. The values are presented separately for the entire sample and for 
the sub-sample of farm operators engaged in off-farm employment. In terms of the 
dependent variables, it is clear that off-farm employment is much more common among Irish 
farm operators than among Italian operators. Among those with off-farm employment, the 
Irish operators commit over three times the amount of off-farm labour relative to the Italian 
farm operators. Possible reasons for this deep difference could be linked to Italian indirect 
calculation of hours worked off-farm, previously described, as well as to the presence of not 
regular off-farm work that, as such, results not declared. The average number of 1,572 hours 
per annum for Irish operators lies slightly above that reported by Hennessy & Rehman 
(2006), which was based solely upon 2002 Teagasc NFS data. 
Among the independent variables, the average age is very similar for farm operators in both 
countries. Italian farm operators have an average age of 55.78 years old compared to 54.35 
years for Irish farm operators. The average age of Irish operators with off-farm employment 
is approximately four years younger than for the Irish sample as a whole. Italian farm 
operators are much more likely to be female than their Irish counterparts. The proportion of 
farms classified as specialist dairy is relatively close in both datasets. We find that Irish farms 
have much larger farm incomes both in terms of coupled and decoupled incomes along with 
larger farms. In addition, Irish farm operators receive much greater amounts in the form of 
other subsidies. 
In terms of the remaining farm-level variables, it appears that the presence of hired workers 
is more common in the case of Italian farms with 26.2% of farms hiring labour compared to 
18.3% in the case of Irish farms. The number of bovine units per UAA hectare is much higher 
on Irish farms. Average farm size is much greater in the case of the Irish farms. This finding 
is supported by Moreddu (2011) which provides results from the 2007 farm structure survey 
carried out in both countries. The farm structure survey includes farms of all sizes whereas 
the FADN database excludes farms with less than 4 European Size Unit (ESU) in the case of 
Italian farms and less than 2 ESU in the case of Irish farms.  
In terms of household variables, we can see that the average household size is much smaller 
among the Italian farms relative to Irish farms. While Irish farms have on average higher 
income, the Irish farm household must support on average at least one more person. A much 
lower percentage of Italian farm operators are married relative to the Irish farm operators, 
and this is probably connected to the measurement problems of this variable described 
above. There are also deep differences in the proportion of farms where a spouse is engaged 
in off-farm employment. This proportion lies at just 6.6% in the case of Italian farms relative 
to 31.7% in the case of Irish farms. There appears to be some correlation between the off-farm 
employment of the operator and the spouse in the case of both countries. In both cases, the 
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proportion of farms with a spouse employed off-farm is greater among the sub-sample of 
farms where the operator is employed off-farm than for the sample as a whole. The Irish data 
does not provide for a variable regarding the number of other family members working on 
the farm. 
6. Results 
The results for the participation Probit model and the hours equation are presented in this 
section.  
Table 2. Results for Probit analysis 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE IRELAND ITALY 
Age 0.355*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 
Age squared -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
Sex -0.255 -0.276 -0.269 -0.140*** -0.143*** -0.151*** 
Specialist dairy  -1.389*** -1.347*** -1.379*** -0.478*** -0.481*** -0.548*** 
UAA (ha) -0.006** -0.005** -0.006** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 
Spouse working off-
farm 
0.0309 0.0413 0.0369 1.486*** 1.487*** 1.482*** 
Married 0.657*** 0.676*** 0.664*** -0.696*** -0.698*** -0.703*** 
Number of young in 
HH 
-0.223*** -0.231*** -0.228*** -0.029 -0.031 -0.032 
Household size 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.114** 
Number of family 
members working 
on the farm 
   -0.220*** -0.222*** -0.219*** 
Hired workers (1,0) -0.026 -0.028 -0.023 -0.200*** -0.204*** -0.196*** 
Number of bovine 
per UAA 
-0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.014** -0.014** -0.015* 
Decoupled payments 
(in €10,000s) 
-0.088   -0.003**   
Coupled income 
(in €10,000s) 
 -0.030   0.001  
Other subsidies   -0.008   -0.001 
_cons -7.410*** -7.243*** -7.263*** -1.655*** -2.517*** -2.123*** 
 
In terms of the impact of decoupling on off-farm work participation, it appears that there is a 
significant negative impact in the case of Italy, but no significant impact in the case of 
Ireland. It therefore appears from the Italian results that the wealth effect has dominated the 
relative wage effect and off-farm employment participation has responded positively as a 
consequence.   
The differentiated impact of decoupled income on off-farm work participation in the two 
countries is interesting. From deeper analysis of the Irish data, it appears that the relative 
strength of the wage and wealth effects varies along the distribution of single farm payments 
but this requires further investigation. The difference could perhaps lie also in the combined 
effect of the level of average payments and off-farm wage in the two countries. Indeed, in the 
Italian sample, the corresponding per-farm average amount of decoupled payments, is only 
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59% of the Irish sample, a fraction that go down to 35% when only the farms with off-farm 
work are considered.3 From this perspective, it is not simple to justify the above results. 
However, in several Italian south regions, the off-farm wage (and unemployment rate) is 
typically lower (higher) than in Ireland, a consideration that at least partially can recompose 
the above evidence.  
Coupled income is not significant for either country. The summary statistics presented in 
Table 1 showed that coupled income is much lower for those Irish farmers engaged in off-
farm employment relative to Irish farmers as a whole. The negative coefficient sign is 
therefore expected but it is not found to be significant. In the Italian case, the difference in 
average coupled income between those working off-farm and the rest does not appear to be 
so wide. It is therefore less surprising to find that coupled income is not a significant of off-
farm work participation in the case of Italy. 
For both countries, the presence of a specialist dairy farm reduces the likelihood of 
participation. We find that age is positively associated with off-farm employment 
participation in both countries but in a non-linear fashion as age squared is negative and 
significant. Interesting, the turning point of the relationship is also very close in the two 
samples, been equal to about 35 years in Ireland and 31 years in Italy. The off-farm 
employment participation of the spouse is found to have no significant impact upon the 
participation decision in Ireland, but a significant and positive one in Italy. The married 
status has a totally different effect in the two samples, pointing to a significant positive effect 
in Ireland, but to a significant negative effect in Italy. This huge discrepancy in results, 
however, could be simply due to a problem of under-reporting in the Italian sample, as 
discussed in the data section. 
The number of young in the household is a negative contributor towards off-farm 
employment participation, although it is statistically significant only in Ireland. Finally, 
household size and the presence of hired workers, is respectively positively and negative 
associated with off-farm employment participation, but the last variable is statistically 
significant only for the Italian sample.  
Table 3. Results for hours equation 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE IRELAND ITALY 
Age 0.877*** 0.895*** 0.941*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 
Agesq -0.0132*** -0.0134*** -0.0140*** -0.00408*** -0.00417*** -0.00411*** 
Sex       
Specialist dairy -4.257*** -4.150*** -4.500*** 0.39 0.32 0.24 
UAA (ha) -0.0203* -0.0180* -0.0226** 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Spouse working 
off-farm 
-0.703*** -0.674*** -0.691*** 4.42*** 4.57*** 4.54*** 
Married 0.483 0.545 0.612 -1.86** -1.94** -1.96** 
Number of young -0.364* -0.388* -0.412** -0.45* -0.46* -0.49* 
Number of family 
members living in 
the farm 
0.0143 0.0318 0.0463 0.51** 0.53** 0.56*** 
Number of family 
members working 
in the farm 
   -0.57* -0.60* -0.61** 
                                                        
3 Note that, differences in farm size, only partially can explain these numbers, suggesting that the 
reason could be attributable to differences in the types of farm activities. 
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Hired workers (1,0) -0.217 -0.244 -0.214 0.15 0.12 0.12 
Number of bovine 
on UAA 
-0.0571** -0.0597** -0.0636*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 
Decoupled 
payments (x 
10,000€) 
-0.0468   -0.17***   
Coupled income  -0.172***   0.17***  
Other subsidies   -0.00333   0.13 
Mills ratio 1.948** 2.050** 2.177** 1.13 1.26 1.23 
_cons 2.791 2.396 1.389 -1.70 -2.27 -2.09 
 
In interpreting the results for the hours equation, we should probably keep in mind that a 
fixed effects model is in place. The choice of fixed effects means that we do not capture the 
effect of covariates that display strong persistency and this could be particularly important 
for some variables that change little in value over time. 
In the hours equation, and coherently with the Probit result, we find for Italy that decoupled 
payments have made a significant negative impact also on the number of hours supplied off-
farm. Quantitatively, the magnitude of the estimated effect appears also relevant from an 
economic point of view, as a €10,000 increase in decoupled payments reduce off-farm labour 
of about 17 hours per annum. Decoupled payments are therefore found to have made a 
significant negative effect on both participation and hours supplied off-farm for the Italian 
case. In a neo-classical framework, this suggests a strong wealth effect. No significant impact 
is found in the Irish case but the negative sign is also apparent.  
In the Irish case, the coupled income variable is found to have a significant negative effect on 
hours supplied. A €10,000 increase in coupled income on average reduces the off-farm 
labour participation by 17.2 hours per annum, a result virtually identical to the decoupled 
effect in Italy. Perhaps the main surprising result is that coupled income is found to have a 
positive effect upon hours supplied among Italian farmers, an effect of exactly the same order 
of magnitude.  
As in the case of the participation equation, the age variable is significantly positive and non-
linear for both countries. Now the turning point of the relationship, however, is significant 
higher but again fairly similar across sample (66 years for Ireland and 70 years for Italy). 
Farm size has a negative and significant impact on hours supplied among Irish farmers but 
no such relationship appears from the Italian results. Perhaps this reflects low variability in 
farm size over time in the case of the latter. The results also show that being a specialist dairy 
farmer has a significantly negative impact upon hours among Irish farmers but not among 
Italian farmers, a result that could be attributed to the way we are forced to estimated the 
dairy specialization in the Italian sample. In the Irish case, the presence of a dairy farm on 
average reduces hours by approximately 400 to 450 hours per annum depending upon the 
other variables included. 
The off-farm work participation of the spouse appears to have a very strong positive effect in 
the Italian case which is perhaps unexpected. The off-farm employment of the spouse has a 
significant negative effect in the Irish case. This would imply some kind of trade-off taking 
place between the off-farm employment of the spouse and the number of off-farm hours 
supplied by the farm operator. We find that a married marital status has a significantly 
negative effect upon off-farm employment in the Italian data while in the Irish data there is a 
significant relationship between off-farm employment participation and marriage.  
The number of young in the household is a negative contributor towards off-farm 
employment in both samples, and the effect appears to have greater significance in the case 
of participation than for hours. The intensity of livestock farming is unlikely to be among the 
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stable covariates and it appears as expected to have a significantly negative impact upon 
hours supplied in both countries. 
Finally, in the Irish case, the significance of the inverse Mills ratio in the second stage means 
that sample selection is present. Farm operators engaging in off-farm employment are 
therefore found to have unobserved characteristics which make them more likely to engage in 
off-farm employment relative to the group not participating in off-farm work. A result quite 
different from the Italian sample where instead the Mills ratio is never significant. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the determinants of off-farm labour participation in Ireland and Italy 
with the aim of understanding the role played by decoupled payments in this important 
adjustment process. To this end, a neoclassical household model based on utility 
maximisation is used to model farm households’ labour allocation decisions. Under this 
framework, the effect of decoupling on off-farm participation is the result of two contrasting 
effects, namely a wage effect, which should increase the off-farm labour participation, and a 
wealth effect, which should reduce it. Thus, overall, which of the two effects will prevail is an 
empirical question that we addressed through an hours off-farm labour supply equation, and 
an off-farm participation equation, to take care of the possible unobserved selection effects. 
Overall, many of the considered determinants of off-farm labour participation and off-farm 
labour supply in Ireland and Italy, have the expected significant effect, although some 
notable exceptions are present. The results suggest that decoupled payments have a negative 
effect on the off-farm participation decision and on the hours supply in the two samples, 
although this result is significantly different from zero only in the case of Italy. In light of the 
conceptual model framework, this result points to a wage effect that is dominated by the 
wealth effect.  
We detected more differentiated results when coupled income amounts are considered. In 
particular, while coupled payments do not affect the off-farm labour participation in both 
countries, this effect turns out to be significantly negative in Ireland and significantly positive 
in Italy, in the hours supply equation. This is an unexpected result in the case of Italy. In the 
case of Ireland, the result is as expected where coupled income is negatively associated with 
off-farm hours.  
Several reasons relating to both farm type characteristics and specific labour market 
conditions differences can be at work in driving this result. While the proportion of farms 
that can be described as specialist dairy is similar in both countries, there is much more 
reliance upon crops and tillage in the case of Italian farming. The characteristics of farms at 
the top and bottom of the coupled income distribution can therefore differ between both 
countries. In addition, farmers in both countries are likely to be affected by different income 
risks relating to weather, disease and other natural forces. In the case of Ireland, the off-farm 
job demands on average close to 30 hours of labour per week whereas the average number of 
hours is much lower in the case of Italy. Future refinement of the analysis calls for a deeper 
investigation of the differentiated factors that are at the root of the above findings.  
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